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NOTE AND COMMENT 
lNJURir:S ARISING "OuT OF" AN EMPI.0YM£NT.-An employee's duties take 
him into the streets where 'he is injured by being run into by an automobile 
or other vehicle; has he ground for recovery of compensation under the usual 
WoKX:Mr:N's Co:MP£NSATION Ac::t providing for an award for injuries "arising 
out of and in the course of his employment"? Since he was in the street in 
pursuance of his duties and not in going to or from work, it is clear that the 
injury was one arising in the "course of" the employment. But did it arise 
"out of' the employment? 
The English Courts had made this last question tum largely upon the 
degree to which the employee was exposed to the risks of the streets. Thus 
in Pierce v. Provide11t Clothing a11d Supply Co. [19u] I K. B. 997, where the 
claimant was awarded compensation, the Master of the Rolls said: ''This 
work of course necessarily involved spending a great part of the day in the 
streets in this triangular area; and in the course of his duties he was beyond 
all doubt much more exposed to the risks of the streets than ordinary mem-
bers of the public". And in Sheldo11 v. Needham, III L. T. 729, 7 B. W. C. C. 
471, where the claimant, a domestic servant, was injured by slipping on a 
banana skin in the street while going to a mail box for the employer, the 
court held there should be no award, on the ground that the injury was due 
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to a risk no greater than is run by all members of the public. So also in 
Slade v. Taylor, 8 B. W. C. C. 65. The Scotch Courts, on the other hand, 
have not approved the degree of risk test. M'Neice v. Singer Sewing Machine 
Co., l9II S. C. 12; Htiglzes v. Bett, 1915 S. C. 150; White v. Avery, 1916 S. C. 
209. In the last cited case the Lord President said: "It is common ground 
that the accident arose in the course of the appellant's employment. The 
question for our decision is whether it arose out of his employment. Now, 
the learned arbitrator came to the conclusion that it did not, because the 
risk which the appellant ran in walking upon the slippery road was not a 
risk to which he was exposed by the nature of his occupation, but was simply 
an ordinary risk to which every pedestrian was exposed. In my view that 
is an unsound statement of the law, for the risk on that road at that particular 
time appears to me to have been a risk incidental to the man's employment. 
And it was none the less a risk incidental to the man's employment because 
every pedestrian on that road at that time would. have [been] required to 
face it, or because the appellant was facing it for the first and, it may be, 
the only time." 
The point for English law has been set at rest by the House of Lords in 
Dennis v. A. l. White & Co., [1917] A. C. 479, reversing the Court of Ap-
peal. The claimant on his master's business had been hurt while on his 
bicycle in the street by a collision with a tram-car. The conclusion of the 
Scotch cases is approved, while the English cases above cited are eXPressly 
disapproved. The conclusion of the House of Lords would seem to be en-
tirely proper and desirable, the English cases having adopted an unnecessarily 
narrow and technical meaning of the terms of the CoMP~NSA'tION Ac::r. 
But suppose the employee is struck by lightning, or is injured by the ex-
plosion of a bomb dropped by a raiding aeroplane or Zeppelin? Perhaps but 
for his employment the claimant would not have been in the zone of danger. 
'!'hat, however, in the opinion of the learned lords is immaterial, unless the 
duties of his employment .Placed him in a position of eXPosure to such harms 
not shared by the public universally. There must still be some thread of 
causal connection between the employment and the injury. Working upon a 
steeple or high scaffold exposes one to peculiar perils from lightning, and 
perhaps service in a brightly illuminated building or in a munitions plant in-
volves unusual dangers from hostile aircraft. An American employee whose 
duties take him to England where he is injured by such bomb \VOUld seem 
to receive an injury arising "out of'' his employment. See Foley v. Home 
Rubber Co., 8g N. J. L. 474 15 MICH. L. Riw. 6o6, where an award for death 
on the Lusitania was allowed. If it is concluded that the duties of the em-
ployment did expose the claimant to the danger, then it is wholly immaterial 
that others under like conditions but not under employment ran precisely the 
same hazard. So in the case of an employee engaged in running the engine 
-of a threshing outfit injured by the sting of a poisonous wasp the inquiry 
should be as to whether the duties of such employee exposed him to such 
perils, not as to the degree of his risk. If an injury on the street arises "out 
of'' one's employment because the injured party's duties took him into the 
street, and not because of the degree of risk run there, it would seem that the 
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sting of the wasp was an injury arising "out of" the employment, for it 
was the duty of the employee that took him out into the open where he was 
exposed to such perils. But see Amys v. Barton, [1912] I K. B. 40, where 
it was held that death as a result of the sting of a wasp under the circum-
stances ·suggested was not an accident arising "out of" the employment. 
In McNichol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, the court considered the question 
under consideration and laid down certain tests as follows: "It (the injury) 
'arises out of' the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind, 
upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the 
conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the result-
ing injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a 
natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable 
person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occa-
sioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of' the employ-
ment But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the em-
ployment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard 
to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the em-
ployment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the -work and not com-
mon to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the busi-
ness and not independent of the r~lation of master and servant It need not 
have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have 
had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed 
from that source as a rational consequence." Here is a clear recognition of 
the necessity for the causal connection. The &tatement has been frequently 
cited and quoted approvingly. Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87; 
In re Sa11derson's Case, 224 Mass. 558; Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. 
ltrdustrial Board, 277 Ill. g6; H11lley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161; Mann 
v. Glastonbury Knitting Co., 90 Conn. n6; State v. District Court (Minn. 
1917) 164 N. W. 1012. Quite generally the courts make the case tum upon 
the presence or absence of "special" or "extra" hazard beyond what other 
people in the same situation, aside from the employment, are exposed to, 
which apparently is the very consideration repudiated by the House of Lords. 
In Mahowald v. 1'/tompson-Starrett Co., 134 Minn. n3, where a teamster 
injured on the street was allowed compensation, the court said: "If his em-
ployment as a teamster upon the streets of a large city, where he not only 
had to look out for his own safety but also for that of his employer's team 
and rig, necessarily accentuated the street risks to ltim above those to other 
occasional travelers (italics ours), it suffices for the conclusion that this acci-
dent arose out of his employment". And in Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 
supra, where the decision perhaps could have gone on the ground that the 
employee when hurt was not in the "course of" his employment, the court 
denied an award because he had not been exposed to any more risk on the 
street than any other traveler. In Beaudry v. Watkins, 191 Mich. 445, how-
ever, the court allowed cot;npensation for the death of a boy injured while on 
a bicycle in the street, without any mention of the extra hazard to which 
his employment exposed him. R. W. A. 
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PERFoRMANCS 0:11 AN EXISTING OBI,IGATION AS CoNSIDtRATION FOR A PROM-
1sr:.-The dictum that if there be nothing in a rule flatly contradictory to 
reason the law will presume it to be well founded, and that the office of the 
judge is "jus dicere and not jus dare", is responsible for much agony of con-
struction and tortious logic on the part of courts tom by ·desire to evade it 
in the interest of modern ideas of right. There is a trilogy of accepted legal 
principles which it has been particularly difficult for the courts to adhere 
to in spirit or to repudiate in letter. They are the propositions, that for a 
promise to be enforcible a consideration must emanate from the promisee, 
that doing what one is already legally bound to do is not a consideration, and 
that one is legally bound to perform a contract according to its terms. In 
·other words, doing what one has already contracted to do is not consideration 
for a promise made on condition or in contemplation of such performance. 
Under this rule, if A. has contracted to do something for B., his actual per-
formance of that promise can not be consideration for a new pbrmise by B. 
or a collateral promise by C. There is no lack of real application of the rule. 
Stilk v. Myrich, 2 Camp. 317; Frazer v. Hatton, 2 C. B. N. S. 512; Harris v. 
Carter, 3 E. & B. 559; Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 26o; Seybolt v. 
N. Y., L. E. etc. R. R., 95 N. Y. 562; Village of Seneca Falls v. Botsch, 149 
N. Y. Supp. 320; Ayers v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 52 Iowa 478; Conover v. 
Stillwell, 34 N. J. L. 54; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328; Vance v. Ellison, 
76 W. Va. 592; Muir v. Morris, 8o Ore. 378; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. 
Y. 392; McDevit v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515. 
But while courts feel constrained to follow the rule, they have not been 
hesitant in condemning it as unsuited to modern ideas. They "have rarely 
failed, ~pon any recurrence of the question, to criticise and condemn its 
reasonableness, justice, fairness or honesty". Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164 
So also Mr. Ames, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515, 521; Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 
6o5 ; Harper v. Graham, 20 Oh. 1o6. One court, at least, "profoundly and pain-
fully impressed with the slavish adherence of the legal and judicial mind to 
precedent, or, in many cases, to what seems to be precedent only", flatly 
denied, so far as payment of money is concerned, that doing what one is 
legally bound to do is not consideration. Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499. 
Mr. Justice Holmes, in revolt against imitation of the past as the basis of 
modem law, evades the rule, unofficially, by denying that one is legally bound 
·to perform a contract according to its terms. IO HARV. L. REV. 457, 462; 
THJ;: COMMON LAW, pp. 300 ff. The court in Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, 
takes the same view officially. 
These, how~ver, are unusual instances. Other courts, while they evince 
willingness to escape application of the rule, recognize its existence and bind-
ing force, and evade it only when they can do so on some plausible distinc-
tion or more or less specious assumption. Thus, a number of cases hold the 
making of the new promise to be sufficient evidence of mutual rescission of 
the first contract. On this assumption, the original contractor is no longer 
bound by that agreement and his doing what he had originally promised, or 
promising a second time to do it, is of course a consideration for the con-
tractee's new promise. Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 388; Linz v. Schuck, 
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100 Md. 220; Agel v. Patch Mfg. Co., 77 Vt. 13; Thomas v. Barnes, 156 
Mass. 581. Sometimes, without denying that a contractor is legally bound to 
'Perform according to the terms of the contract, courts, paradoxically, hold 
that his actual performance instead of mere payment of damages for non-
Jlerforniance is a consideration for the new promise. Lattimore v. Harsen, 
14 Johns. (N. Y.) 330; Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489; Bishop v. Busse, 6g 
Ill. 403. Other courts say that performing according to existing contract in-
stead of exercising an opprtunity to go into bankruptcy is consideration for 
the new promise. l;Ielroy v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381; Engbretson v. Seiber-
ling, 122 Iowa 522. But on the whole, American courts adhere to the prin-
ciples established. Even the courts which evade their application make as-
sumption, as pointed out, that the prior obligation has been rescinded, or 
<Jtherwise escape from taking the position that there is no legal obligation 
to perform a contract according to its terms. 
The extra cog in the wheels of logic by which consideration is explained 
is the case of Shadwell v. Shadwell, 30 L. J. C. P. 145, and the English doc-
trine based upon it. In that case the performance by one person of what 
he was already under contract to do, was held to be consideration for a 
third person's promise to him. Every writer who has i::iot ignored this case 
has taken his tum at condemning, harmonising or explaining the decision 
according to his own ideas. No one has succeeded in making it harmonise 
with both principles, that doing what one is already legally bound to do is 
not consideration, and that one is legally bound to perform a contract accord-
ing to its terms. But this is an English case and the trilogy of principles was 
saved in this country by the fact, to quote Mr. Williston, that "the almost uni-
form current of authority in this country is that neither performance nor 
promise of peclormance of what one is already bound to do by contract with 
a third person, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise." 
The Court of Appeals of New York, however, has just dammed this current 
<>f authority by its decision in the case of Cicco v. Schweizer, handed down 
November 13, 1917, Daily Record (Syracuse) Dec. 10, 1917. It appears from 
the case, that in 1902 one Count Oberto Gulinelli was engaged to mar& 
Schweizer's daughter. Four days before the marriage was to take place 
Schweizer promised in writing to pay to the daughter the sum of $z,500 an-
nually while both he and she should live. The daughter and her husband 
assigned this promise to the plaintiff who sued for the installment for the 
year 1912, which Schweizer had refused to pay. The written agreement 
reads, "Whereas, Miss Blanche Josephine Schweizer, * * * is now affianced 
to and is to be married to the above said Count Oberto Giacomo Giovanni 
Francesco Maria Gulinelli, now, in consideration of all that is herein set 
forth the said Mr. Joseph Schweizer promises and expressly agrees by the 
present contract to pay" the sum named. From statements of the court it 
appears that the promise was made to the Count only, although, the court 
says, it was intended for the benefit of the daughter and she might have 
sued upon it. There is nowhere in the agreement any indication that the en-
gagement between the daughter and her count had been broken or was 
about to be rescinded, and the court explicitly states that neither of the parties 
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to the marriage promised the father anything. The court seems to say that 
the consideration was the fact that the parties to the e.'Cisting marriage con-
tract did not mutually rescind it. Had the promise run to bob of them the 
differentiation from Shadwell v. Shadwell might have been well taken. But 
it ran to the Count alone. The daughter was not a party to the father's 
agreement, and that she should refrain from acquiescing in a dissolution of 
. her agreement with the Count was a condition, not a consideration. To hold 
the act of a third person, to whom no promise has been made, to be a con-
sideration would be entirely out of harmony with the idea of reciprocation 
between the promise and the consideration, the idea of "exchange" of promises 
or of a promise for an act that is found in every definition of consideration. 
There is no authority prior to the principal case for disregarding the necessity 
of reciprocation. The sole consideration, therefor, was the performance by 
the Count of the contract of marriage by which he was already bound at the 
time of the defendant's promise. The court holds that the parties married not 
because they had agreed to do so, but because the father had promised to 
give the daughter $z,500 per year if they should do so. 
This comes perilously close to giving the doctrine of Shadwell v. Shadwell 
American authority, and it does drop an obstruction in the course of our logic. 
While the decision stands as sound, either the happening of an event extrane-
ous to the promisee's volition may be. a consideration, or one is not legally 
bound to perform an existing contract, -or doing what one is already legally 
bound to do may be consideration for a new promise. Either our established 
notions of consideration as something within the promisee's volition and 
emanating from him are upset by the case, or it is fresh authority for the 
proposition that any act of the promisee induced by the promise, and intended 
to be so induced, is consideration for the promise. I4 MICH. L. Rmr. 570. 
J.B. W. 
ACQUIRING JURISDICTION WI'l'HOU'l' P£RSONAI, SERVICE, StIZU~ OR AID OF 
S'l'ATU'l't.-It is often assumed that courts can acquire jurisdiction only by 
personal service to give jurisdiction in perso11am, or by a seizure to give 
jurisdiction in rem; but it is not so. The assumption is induced no doubt 
by the fact that in the ordinary common law actions jurisdiction is acquired 
in that way. Mr. Justice Field very distinctly pointed out in the case of 
Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 7I4, that it was not the fact that the 
land was not seized that rendered the judgment void. It was the fact that the 
land was not the res in litigation in the prior case that made the judgment 
void. 
Laying aside the common law actions of writ of error, certiorari, and the 
like, in which superior courts always acquired jurisdiction without any per-
sonal service or seizure, as being in their nature rather continuations of prior 
actions in other courts, than a grasp of fresh jurisdiction; no such explana-
tion can be made to justify the fact that courts of probate and administration 
have from the earliest history of the common law to the present time taken 
jurisdiction without either of these supposed requisites. Someone suggests 
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to the court that a citizen has died and petitions that his estate be adminis-
tered; whereupon the court immediately takes jurisdiction without any seizure 
at all, appoints someone to collect dues and guard the assets till a final hear-
ing can be had, and orders notice published to all persons interested to appear 
and defend. No seizure has ever been supposed essential to confer jurisdic-
tion. If the administrator does in fact take possession of certain assets, no 
one ever supposed that the court's jurisdiction was confined to the assets so 
seized. 
Courts of equity never supposed that any seizure was necessary in the 
absence of personal service to give them jurisdiction in suits to quiet title, 
to foreclose mortgages, and the like; nor was any such seizure ever in fact 
made. The land being immovable there was no danger of it being spirited 
away before a decree could be awarded, and seizure would be an idle cere-
mony. If a levy on the attached property in the statutory actions of attach-
ment at law has been required by the statute, it has been rather with the 
view to make sure that the property would be on hand to answer the judg-
ment that might thereafter be rendered, than because of any notion that a 
seizure was necessary to confer jurisdiction. 
The statutes of the various states have long sanctioned proceedings in rem 
against property in the hands of persons other than the owner without any 
seizure of the property or personal notice to the owner, by merely summoning 
the person in possession as garnishee; and even in case there is no tangible 
property, but a mere indebtedness by the garnishee, a summons to him to 
hold the indebtedness and account to the court for it has been declared by 
statute to give the court jurisdiction to proceed in rem against the indebted-
ness without obtaining any jurisdiction in Personam against the principal 
debtor; and the constitutionality of these statutes has been sustained in Harris 
v. Balk (1905), lg8 U. S. 2i5, 25 S. Ct. 625, and numerous other cases. 
Courts of chancery have generally refused to entertain suits in the nature 
of creditors' bills until the creditor has reduced his claim to judgment at law 
and had execution levied or returned nulla bona, not because of any supposed 
jurisdictional impediment to entertainment of such suits without personal 
service on the debtor or seizure of the property, but because the creditor has 
no standing in equity till he has exhausted his remedy at law. PoMttOY, EQ. 
]UR., § 1415. 
But if the creditor's claim is not legal but merely equitable, for which 
reason he could maintain no action at law, no reason is apparent why a 
court of chancery should not take jurisdiction at once to afford him relief 
though there is no tangible property that can be seized, and the defendant 
cannot be personally served in the jurisdiction; and no statute expressly em-. 
powers the court to act in such cases. The court would seem to possess this 
jurisdiction by reason of its general jurisdiction to grant relief on the claim 
involved, or because there is no adequate remedy at law. 
In Murray v. Murray (18g6), II5 Cal. 266, 37 L. RA. 626, 56 Am. St. 95, 
a woman who had been seduced, later married her seducer, and had been 
immediately deserted by him, filed a bill for separate maintenance without 
prayer for divorce, and prayed that property that he had transferred after the 
I86 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
seduction but before the marriage to get it out of her reach be appropriated 
for that purpose. The husband was not found in the state, did not appear, 
and the transferee demurred, contending that she was not such a creditor at 
the time of the transfer as could object to the transfer for fraud, and as a 
creditor could not maintain a bill before obtaining judgment; but the court 
sustained her bill, and said that attachment is not the only means by which 
the court may acquire control of the property of the absentee defendant so as 
to make it a proceeding in rem; Harrison and Temple, JJ., dissenting. 
The assumption of such jurisdiction in the recent case of Kelley v. Baus-
man (Wash., Oct. 26, 1917), 168 Pac. 181, seems fully justified on both 
reason and authority, though dissented from by Ellis, C. J., and Holcomb, 
Main, and Parker, JJ. In this case complainant seeking a decree of separate 
maintenance against her husband who was not found within the state, made 
persons holding property belonging to him and corporations in which he 
held stock, defendants, and prayed for and obtained a preliminary injunction 
restraining the defendants from parting with the property, and a final decree 
requiring the defendants to tum the property into the registry of the court 
for her benefit. 
In sustaining a similar decree in a like case appealed from the supreme 
court of Ohio, Mr. Justice Brandeis said in Pennington v. Fourth National 
Bank (1917), 243 U. S. 26g, 271, "In. ordinary garnishment proceedings the 
obligation enforced is a debt existing at the commencement of the action, 
whereas the obligation to pay alimony arises only as a result of the suit 
The distinction is in this connection without legal significance. The power 
of the state to proceed against the property of an absent defendant is the 
same whether the obligation sought to be enforced is an admitted indebted-
ness or a contested claim. It is the same whether the claim is liquidated or 
is unliquidated, like a claim for damages in contract or in tort It is like-
wise immaterial that the claim is at the commencement of the suit inchoate, 
to be perfected only by time or the action of the court." 
In another case, also for alimony, against a defendant not found within 
the state, the supreme court of Kansas said in Wesner v. O'Brien (18g6), 56 
Kan. 724, "The essential matter is that the defendant shall have legal notice 
of the proposed appropriation, and ·this is afforded by the publication notice 
which warns the defendant that one of the purposes of the proceeding is the 
sequestration of the land. It refers interested parties to the petition, in which 
the land is definitely described, and wherein it is asked that the land be set 
apart as alimony: A formal seizure is no more essential to the jurisdiction 
of the court in a proceeding of this kind than in an action to quiet title to 
land, based alone on constructive service." 
The supreme court of Iowa has gone so far as to hold in a case of this 
kind, that a mere prayer for such alimony as the court shall deem equitable, 
without any prayer for sequestration of the particular property to that pur-
pose, gave the court jurisdiction to award the alimony out of property which 
the complainant had caused to be attached in the proceeding in a mistaken 
attempt to adapt the legal action of attachment under the statute to a suit 
for divorce to which it did not extend, and although the defendant in the di-
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vorce proceeding was not served within the state and did not appear; for 
the reason that the fact that the statute did not warrant attachments in 
divorce proceedings was an irregularity which could not be availed of col-
laterally. Twing v. O'Meara (1882), 59 Iowa 326. See also Thurston v. 
Thurston (18g4), 58 Minn. 279; Wood v. Price (1911), 79 N. J. Eq. 1; Ben-
ner v. Benner (1900), 63 Ohio St. 220; Bailey v. Bailey (1900), lZJ N. Car. 474-
J. R.R. 
!NSURAN~ POLICIES AS Ass~s IN BANKRUPTCY.-The Supreme Court of 
the United States, in the recent case of Cohen v. Samuels, 38 Sup. Ct. 36, has 
put an end to a method, approved by some of the lower Federal Courts, where-
by a person could create a fund which would be completely under his control 
but which would nevertheless be protected against any claim on the part of 
his trustee in bankruptcy. The circumstances in the principal case were as 
follows: Samuels had taken out ordinary life insurance policies, with the 
usual provisions as to loan and surrender values, payable to certain of his 
Telatives as beneficiaries, but with a provision reserving to Samuels the 
right to change the beneficiary without the latter's consent. At the time 
of Samuels' bankruptcy these surrender values were about $1,200, and if 
before that time Samuels had wished to realize on such surrender values, 
all that he need have done was to name himself as beneficiary and thus be-
come entitled to the amount. He became bankrupt, and now insists that the 
policies do not pass to bis trustee in bankruptcy as assets because, not being 
payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, they do not fall 
within the language of § 70, which defines what property shall pass to the 
trustee. And his claim was apparently so well fortified by authority that the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York felt impelled to uphold 
it, and was supported by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, where, however, HOUGH, C. J., registered a vigorous dissent. 
The difficulty arises from the language of § 70, which provides that the 
trustee shall be vested with the title of the bankrupt to various classes of 
property, including "* * * (3) powers which be might have exercised for 
his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised for some other 
person; * * * (5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he could 
by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and 
sold under judicial process against him: Provided, That when any bankrupt 
shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to 
himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, within thirty days 
after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee 
by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so 
ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own and carry such policy free 
from the claims of the creditors, * * * otherwise the policy shall pass to the 
trustee as assets; * * *" In the earlier years of the administration of the 
BANKRUPTCY Ac:r there was considerable doubt as to the precise effect of this 
proviso as to life-insurance policies. Some courts took the view that such 
policies passed to the trustee as property which the bankrupt "could by any 
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means have transferred" except that he might retain those having a sur-
render value by paying this value to the trustee; under this view it is clear 
that the trustee would be entitled to a policy like those under consideration, 
because it could have been transferred by the bankrupt. Other courts took 
the view that no policies passed to the trustee except those having a sur-
render value, and they only to the extent of that value. The latter view was 
finally adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Burlingham v. 
Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 and Everett v. Judson, 2:z8 U. S. 474 though in the 
earlier case of Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202, there is some indication 
that the court at that time inclined toward the foi:mer view. 
In his opinion in Burlingham v. Crouse, Mr. Justice DAY used the words: 
"We think it was the purpose of Congress to pass to the trustee that sum 
which was available to the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy as a cash 
asset * * *" And those words have frequently been construed as a limitation 
on the interest which the trustee can obtain. In ~MINGTON, BANKRUP'.rCY, 
§ 1002, for instance, the rule is expressed as follows : "The trustee is entitled 
to the cash surrender value, and only to the cash surrender value tl1at would 
have been obtainable from the insurance company at the date of the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition, upon all policies on the bankrupt's life that are not 
exempt by state law and that are payable to the bankrupt, his estate or personal 
representative.'' Practically the same proposition is stated in CoLLmR, BANK-
RUPTCY, (nth Ed.) u39. Such a limitation, restricting the trustee's right 
to the cash surrender value payable at the time of the fling of the petition, 
and to policies payable to the bankrupt, was hardly necessary to the decision 
of the Burlingham case, but, as is seen above, it was adopted as law by text 
writers (though ~MING'l'ON insisted that the contrary view was preferable)' 
and was followed in most of the subsequently arising cases in which the pre-
cise point was presented. In most of these cases the policy was, under state 
laws, exempt from the claims of creditors, and under § 6 of the BANKRUP'.rCY 
AC1t would therefore not pass to the trustee in any event. In re Cohen, 230 
Fed. 733; Frederick v. Insurance Co., 235 Fed. 639. But the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re Arkin, 231 Fed. 947, 146 C. C. A. 
143, decided that such a policy did not pass to the trustee, and the same court 
came to the same conclusion in the principal case when it was before them, in 
In re Samuels, 237 Fed. 7g6, 151 C. C. A. 38. In both these cases the court 
relied on its previous decision in In re Hammel & Co., 221 Fed. 56, 137 C.C.A. 
So, but as is clearly pointed out by HouGH, C. J., in his dissent in 237 Fed. 799, 
151 C. C. A. 41, the Hammel case dealt with a policy which did not have a sur-
render value, but only a loan value. In the case of In re Bonvillain, 232 Fed. 
370, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that under 
the law of Louisiana such a policy would pass to the trustee, but it seems that 
this case, like the somewhat similar case of Malone v. Cohn, 230 Fed. 882, 
150 C. C. A. 144 is based on a misconception of the effect of § 70 as declared 
in Burlingham v. Crouse, and treats the policy as property governed by the 
general language of the section, and not as a peculiar class of property gov-
erned by the proviso. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, when confronted by the problem 
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in the principal case, did not minimize the difficulties raised by the language 
in Burlingham v. Crouse which seems to put a strict limitation upon the trus-
tee's rights but cut the Gordian lmot by invoking clause (3) of § 70, which 
vests the trustee in bankruptcy with powers which the bankrupt could have 
exercised for his own benefit. This way out of the difficulty brings about a 
desirable result, though it somewhat weakens the theory that the proviso in 
§ 70 is a complete, exclusive, self-contained expression of all the law as to 
life-insurance policies in bankruptcy. And the court says : "Our conclusions 
would be the same if we regarded the proviso alone", justifying its conclu-
sion by the obviously undesirable result of a contrary holding in making an 
insurance policy "a shelter for valuable assets and, it might be, for fraud". 
It seems clear that the Circuit Court of Appeals gave an unwarranted effect 
to the decision in Burlingham v. Crouse, and that the Supreme Court has in 
the principal case laid down a much more desirable rule. E. H. 
